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Abstract
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multi-
ple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the
current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders
are single minded. The auction minimizes the cost of procurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive com-
patibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction
also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility. When bidders submit X-OR bids on two disjoint
bundles, we show how the current state of the art can be used for developing optimal auctions.
Keywords : Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC), Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC), Indi-
vidual Rationality (IR), Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction, Optimal Mechanism
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Background
Auction based mechanisms are extremely relevant in modern day electronic procurement systems [2, 15] since
they enable a promising way of automating negotiations with suppliers and achieving the ideal goals of pro-
curement efficiency and cost minimization. In many cases it may be beneficial to allow the suppliers to bid on
combinations of items rather than on single items. Such auctions are called combinatorial auctions. Simply
defined, a combinatorial auction is a mechanism where bidders can submit bids on combinations of items. The
winner determination problem is to select a winning set of bids such that each item to be bought is included
in at least one of the selected bids, and the total cost of procurement is minimized. In this paper, our interest
is in multi-unit combinatorial procurement auctions, where a buyer is interested in procuring multiple units of
multiple items.
In mechanism design literature, an optimal auction refers to an auction which optimizes a performance
metric (for example maximizes revenue to a seller or minimizes cost to a buyer) subject to two critical game
theoretic properties: (1) incentive compatibility and (2) individual rationality. Incentive compatibility comes
in two forms: dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC).
DSIC property is a property that guarantees that reporting true valuations (or costs as the case may be) is a
best response for each bidder, irrespective of the valuations (or costs) reported by the other bidders. BIC is
a much weaker property which ensures that truth revelation is a best response for each bidder whenever the
other bidders are also truthful. Individual rationality (IR) is a property which assures non-negative utility to
each participant in the mechanism thus ensuring their voluntary participation. The IR property may be (1)
ex-ante IR (if the bidders decide on participation even before knowing their exact types (valuations or costs)
1
or (2) interim IR (if the bidders decide on participation just after observing their types), or ex-post IR (if the
bidders can withdraw even after the game is over). For more details on these concepts, the reader is referred to
[5, 6, 12, 14].
1.2 Contributions and Outline
In his seminal work, Myerson [14] characterized an optimal auction for selling a single unit of a single item.
Extending his work has been attempted by several researchers and there have been some generalizations of
his work for multi-unit single item auctions [11, 9, 7]. Armstrong [1] characterized an optimal auction for two
objects where type sets are binary. Malakhov and Vohra [11] studied an optimal auction for a single item
multi-unit procurement auctions using a network interpretation. An implicit assumption in the above papers
is that the sellers have limited capacity for the item. They also assume that the valuation sets are discrete.
Kumar and Iyengar [9] and Gautam, Hemachandra, Narahari, Prakash [7] have proposed an optimal auction
for multi-unit, single item procurement.
Recently, Ledyard [10] has looked at single unit combinatorial auctions in the presence of single minded
bidders. A single minded bidder is one who only bids on a particular subset of the items. Ledyard’s auction,
however, does not take into account multiple units of multiple items and this motivates our current work which
extends Ledyard’s auction to the case of procuring multiple units of multiple items. The following are our
specific contributions.
1. We characterize Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality for procuring multiple
units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded, by deriving a necessary and sufficient condition.
2. We design an optimal auction that minimizes the cost of procurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive
compatibility and interim individual rationality.
3. We show under appropriate regularity conditions that the proposed optimal auction also satisfies dominant
strategy incentive compatibility.
Some of the results presented here appeared in our paper [8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we will explain our model in Section 2 and describe the
notation that we use. We also outline certain essential technical details of optimal auctions from the literature.
In Section 3, we present the three contributions listed above. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a scenario in which there is a buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer is interested in procuring a set
of distinct objects, I. She is interested in procuring multiple units of each object. She specifies her demand for
each object. The sellers are single minded. That is each seller is interested in selling a specific bundle of the
objects. We illustrate through an example below.
Example 2.1. Consider a buyer interested in buying 100 units of A, 150 units of B, and 200 units of C.
Assume that there are three sellers. Seller 1 might be interested in providing 70 units of bundle {A,B}, that is,
70 units of A and 70 units of B as a bundle. Because he is single minded, he does not bid for any other bundles.
We also assume that he would supply equal numbers of A and B. Similarly, seller 2 may provide a bid for 100
units of the bundle {B,C}. The bid from seller 3 may be 125 units of the bundle {A,C}.
The sellers are capacitated i.e. there is a maximum quantity of the bundle of interest they could supply.
The bid therefore specifies a unit cost of the bundle and the maximum quantity that can be supplied. After
receiving these bids, the buyer will determine the allocation and payment as per auction rules.
We summarize below important assumptions in the model.
• The sellers are single minded.
• The sellers can collectively fulfill the demands specified by the buyer.
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Table 1: Notation
I Set of items the buyer is interested in buying, {1, 2, . . . ,m}
Dj Demand for item j, j = . . .m
N Set of sellers. {1, 2, . . . , n}
ci True cost of production of one unit of bundle of interest to the seller i,
ci ∈ [ci, c¯i]
qi True capacity for bundle which seller i can supply, qi ∈ [qi, q¯i]
cˆi Reported cost by the seller i
qˆi Reported capacity by the seller i
θi True type i.e. cost and capacity of the seller i, θi = (ci, qi)
bi Bid of the seller i. bi = (cˆi, qˆi)
b Bid vector, (b1, b2, . . . , bn)
b−i Bid vector without the seller i, i.e. (b1, b2, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn)
ti(b) Payment to the seller i when submitted bid vector is b
Ti(bi) Expected payment to the seller i when he submits bid bi.
Expectation is taken over all possible values of b−i
xi = xi(b) Quantity of the bundle to be procured from the seller i
when the bid vector is b
Xi(bi) Expected quantity of the bundle to be procured from the seller i
when he submits bid bi.
Expectation is taken over all possible values of b−i
fi(ci, qi) Joint probability density function of (ci, qi)
Fi(ci, qi) Cumulative distribution function of fi(ci, qi)
fi(ci|qi) Conditional probability density function of production cost
when it is given that the capacity of the seller i is qi
Fi(ci|qi) Cumulative distribution function of fi(ci|qi)
Hi(ci, qi) Virtual cost function for seller i,
Hi(ci, qi) = ci +
Fi(ci|qi)
fi(ci|qi)
ρi(bi) Expected offered surplus to seller i, when his bid is bi
ui(b, θi) Utility to seller i, when bid vector is b and his type is θi
Ui(bi, θi) Expected utility to the seller i, when he submits bid bi and his
type is θi. Expectation is taken over all possible values of b−i
• The sellers are capacitated i.e. they can not supply beyond the capacity specified in the bids.
• The seller will never inflate his capacity, as it can be detected. If he fails to supply the quantity exceed-
ing his capacity, he incurs a penalty which is deterrent on inflating his capacity. This is an important
assumption.
• Whenever a buyer buys anything from the seller, she will procure the same number of units of each of the
items from the seller’s bundle of interest.
• All the participants are rational and intelligent.
Table 1 shows the notation that will be used in the rest of the paper.
2.1 Some Preliminaries
The problem of designing an optimal mechanism was first studied by Myerson [14] and Riley and Samuelson
[16]. Myerson’s work is more general and considers the setting of a seller trying to sell a single unit of a single
object to one of several possible buyers. Note here that, unlike the rest of paper, the auctioneer is the seller
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and his objective is to maximize the revenue. (In the rest of the paper, the auctioneer will be a buyer and her
objective will be to minimize the cost of procurement.) So in this particular setting, as per notation defined in
Table 1, m = 1, D1 = 1. (So, qi will be 1 for all the agents and no longer a private information). Fi, Hi defined
in Table 1 will be function of single variable. The buyer’s private information will be the maximum cost he is
willing to pay, which we will denote as θi. θi ∈ Θi = [θi, θi].
Myerson [14] characterizes all auction mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim in-
dividually rational in this setting. From this, he derives the allocation rule and the payment function for the
optimal auction mechanism, using an interesting notion called the virtual cost function, defined as follows:
Hi(θi) = θi −
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
He has shown that an optimal auction is one with allocation rule as:
xi(θ) = 1 if Hi(θi) > max
{
0,max
j 6=i
Hj(θj)
}
= 0 otherwise (1)
Ti(θi) = Eb
−i
(ui(θ)− θi(xi(θ)))
= Ui(θi)− θiXi(θi)
=
∫ θi
θi
Xi(s)ds− θiXi(θi) (2)
One such payment rule is given by,
ti(θi, θ−i) =
(∫ θi
θi
xi(s, θ−i)ds
)
−
(
θixi(θ)
)
∀θ
Any auction for single unit of an single item which satisfies Equation (1) and Equation (2) is optimal i.e.
maximizes seller’s revenue and is BIC and IIR.
Regularity Assumption: If Hi(θi) is increasing with respect to θi, then we say, the virtual cost function is
regular or regularity condition holds true. Under this assumption one such optimal auction is,
1. Collect bids from the buyers
2. Sort them according to their virtual costs
3. If the highest virtual cost is positive, allocate the object to the corresponding bidder
4. The winner, say i, will pay ti(θ−i)
= inf{θi|Hi(θi) > 0 and Hi(θi) > Hj(θj)∀j 6= i}
From the payment rule, it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid truthfully under the regularity
assumption. When bidders are symmetric, i.e. Fi is same ∀i, then the above optimal auction is Vickrey’s
second price auction [17].
Myerson’s work can be easily extended to the case of multi-unit auctions with unit demand. But problems
arise when the unit-demand assumption is relaxed. We move into a setting of multi-dimensional type information
which makes truth elicitation non-trivial. Several attempts have addressed this problem, albeit under some
restrictive assumptions [11, 9, 7]. It is assumed, for example, that even though the seller is selling multiple units
(or even objects), the type information of the entities is still one dimensional [3, 4, 18].
Researchers have also worked on extending Myerson’s work for an optimal auction for multiple objects. The
private information, in this setting may not be single dimensional. Armstrong [1] has solved this problem for
two object case, when type sets are binary by enumerating all incentive compatibility conditions. Recently,
Ledyard [10] has characterized an optimal multi-object single unit auction, when bidders are single minded.
4
3 Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction
We will start this section with an example to illustrate that in a multi-unit, multi-item procurement auction,
the suppliers may have an incentive to misreport their costs.
Example 3.1. Suppose the buyer has a requirement for 1000 units. Also, suppose that there are four suppliers
with (ci, qi) values of S1 : (10, 500), S2 : (8, 500), S3 : (12, 800) and S4 : (6, 500). Suppose the buyer conducts the
classic kth price auction, where the payment to a supplier is equal to the cost of the first losing supplier. In this
case, the sellers will be able to do better by misreporting types. To see this, consider that all suppliers truthfully
bid both the cost and the quantity bids. The allocation then would be S1 : 0, S2 : 500, S3 : 0, S4 : 500 and this
minimizes the total payment. Under this allocation the payment to S4 would be 10× 500 = 5000 currency units.
However, if he bids his quantity to be 490, then the allocation changes to S1 : 10, S2 : 500, S3 : 0, S4 : 490
giving him a payment of 12× 490 = 5880 currency units and thus incentive compatibility does not hold. Thus it
is evident that such uniform price mechanisms are not applicable to the case where both unit cost and maximum
quantity are private information. The intuitive explanation for this could be that by under reporting their
capacity values, the suppliers create an artificial scarcity of resources in the system. Such fictitious shortages
force the buyer to pay overboard for use of the virtually limited resources.
We also make another observation here. Suppose, the seller 4 bids (6,600). Then the buyer will order from
him 600 units at the cost of 10 per unit. Being his capacity 500, he would not be able to supply the remaining
100 units. If he bids (6,1000), then he will be paid only 8 per unit and the buyer will be ordering him 1000
units. This clearly indicates our assumption that a seller will not inflate his capacity is quite natural.
We are interested in designing an optimal mechanism, for a buyer, that satisfies Bayesian incentive compati-
bility (BIC) and individual rationality (IR). BIC means that the best response of each seller is to bid truthfully
if all the other sellers are bidding truthfully. IR implies the players have non-negative payoff by participating
in the mechanism. More formally, these can be stated as (see Table 1 for notation),
∀i ∈ N and ∀ θi ∈ [ci, c¯i]× [qi, q¯i]
Ui(θi, θi) ≥ Ui(bi, θi)∀ bi, (BIC) (3)
Ui(θi, θi) ≥ 0 (IR) (4)
The IR condition above corresponds to interim individual rationality.
3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for BIC and IR
To make the sellers report their types truthfully, the buyer has to offer them incentives. We propose the following
incentive, motivated by paying a seller higher than what he claims to be the total cost of the production for the
ordered quantity. ∀i ∈ N,
ρi(bi) = Ti(bi)− cˆiXi(bi), where bi = (cˆi, qˆi)
⇒
Ui(bi, θi) = Ti(bi)− ciXi(bi)
= ρi(bi)− (ci − cˆi)Xi(bi) (5)
With the above offered incentive, we now state and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Any mechanism in the presence of single minded, capacitated sellers is BIC and IR iff
1. ρi(bi) = ρi(c¯i,qˆi) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
Xi(t, qˆi)dt
2. ρi(bi) non-negative, and non-decreasing in qˆi ∀ cˆi ∈ [ci, c¯i]
3. The quantity which seller i is asked to supply, Xi(ci, qi) is non-increasing in ci ∀qi ∈ [qi, q¯i].
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Proof. : A similar theorem is presented by Kumar and Iyengar [9] for the case of multi-unit single item pro-
curement auctions. Using the notion of single minded bidder [10], we state and prove a result for a wider
setting.
To prove the necessity part of the theorem, we first observe that,
Ui(bi, θi) = Ui(cˆi, qˆi, ci, qi) = Ti(bi)− ciXi(bi)
and BIC ⇒ Ui(cˆi, qˆi, ci, qi) ≤ Ui(ci, qi, ci, qi),
∀(cˆi, qˆi) and (ci, qi) ∈ Θi
In particular,
Ui(cˆi, qi, ci, qi) ≤ Ui(ci, qi, ci, qi)
Without loss of generality, we assume cˆi > ci. Rearrangement of these terms yields,
Ui(cˆi, qi, ci, qi) = Ui(cˆi, qi, cˆi, qi)
+(cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, qi)
⇒
Ui(cˆi, qi, cˆi, qi)− Ui(ci, qi, ci, qi)
cˆi − ci
≤ −Xi(cˆi, qi)
Similarly using,
Ui(ci, qi, cˆi, qi) ≤ Ui(cˆi, qi, cˆi, qi)
−Xi(c, q) ≤
Ui(cˆi, qi, cˆi, qi)− Ui(ci, qi, ci, qi)
cˆi − ci
≤ −Xi(cˆi, qi). (6)
Taking limit cˆi → ci, we get,
∂Ui(ci, qi, ci, qi)
∂ci
= −Xi(ci, qi). (7)
Equation (6) implies, Xi(ci, qi) is non-increasing in ci. This proves statement 3 of the theorem in the forward
direction. When the seller bids truthfully, from Equation (5),
ρi(ci, qi) = Ui(ci, qi, ci, qi). (8)
For BIC, Equation (7) should be true. So,
ρi(ci, qi) = ρi(c¯i, qi) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(t, qi)dt (9)
This proves claim 1 of the theorem. BIC also requires,
qi ∈ arg max
qˆi∈[qi,qi]
Ui(ci, qˆi, ci, qi) ∀ ci ∈ [ci, c¯i]
(Note that qˆi ∈ [qi, qi] and not ∈ [qi, q¯i] as it is assumed that a bidder will not over report his capacity.)
This implies, ∀ ci ρi(ci, qi) should be non-decreasing in qi.. The IR conditions (Equations (4) and (8)) imply
ρi(ci, qi) ≥ 0.
This proves statement 2 of the theorem. Thus, these three conditions are necessary for BIC and IR properties.
We now prove that these are sufficient conditions for BIC and IR. Assume that all three conditions are true,
⇒ Ui(θi, θi) = ρi(ci, qi) ≥ 0.
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So the IR property is satisfied.
Ui(bi, θi) = ρi(cˆi, qˆi) + (cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, qˆi)
= ρi(c¯i, qˆi) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
Xi(t, qˆi)dt
+(cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, qˆi)
= ρi(c¯i, qˆi) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(t, qˆi)dt
−
∫ cˆi
ci
Xi(t, qˆi)dt
+(cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, qˆi)
≤ ρi(ci, qˆi)
as Xi is non-increasing in ci
≤ ρi(ci, qi)
= Ui(θi, θi)
as ρi is non-decreasing in qi
This proves the sufficiency of the three conditions.
3.2 Allocation and Payment Rules of Optimal Auction
The buyer’s problem is to solve,
min Eb
∑n
i=1 ti(b) s.t.
1. ti(b) = ρi(b) + cˆixi(b)
2. All three conditions in Theorem 3.1 hold true.
3. She procures at least Dj units of each item j.
Expectation being a linear operator, the buyer’s problem is to minimize
∑n
i=1EbiTi(cˆi, qˆi). Condition 1 of
the theorem has to hold true, which will imply the ith term in the summation is given by,
∫ q¯i
qi
∫ c¯i
ci
(
ciXi(ci, qi) + ρi(c¯i, qi)
+
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(t, qi)dt
)
fi(ci, qi)dcidqi
However,
∫ c¯i
ci
(∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(t, qi)dt
)
fi(ci, qi)dci =∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(ci, qi)Fi(ci|qi)fi(qi)dci
Condition 2 of Theorem 3.1 requires ρi(c¯i, qi) ≥ 0 and the buyer wants to minimize the total payment to be
made. So, she has to assign ρi(c¯i, qi) = 0 ∀ qi, ∀i. So her problem is to solve,
min
∑n
i=1
∫ q¯i
qi
∫ c¯i
ci
(
ci +
Fi(ci|qi)
fi(ci|qi)
)
Xi(ci, qi)fi(ci, qi)dcidqi
That is,
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min
∑n
i=1
∫ q¯i
qi
∫ c¯i
ci
Hi(ci, qi)Xi(ci, qi)
fi(ci, qi)dcidqi
where, Hi(ci, qi) is the virtual cost function, defined in Table 1. Define,
c¯ = (c¯1, c¯2, . . . , c¯n)
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn).
Similarly, define q¯ , q and q. Let,
dc = dc1dc2 . . . dcn
dq = dq1dq2 . . . dqn
f(c, q) =
∏n
i=1 fi(ci, qi)
Her problem now reduces to,
min
∫ q¯
q
∫ c¯
c
(
∑n
i=1Hi(ci, qi)xi(ci, qi))
f(c, q)dcdq s.t.
1. ∀ i, Xi(ci, qi) is non-increasing in ci, ∀ qi.
2. The Buyer’s minimum requirement of each item is satisfied.
This is an optimal auction for the buyer in the presence of the single minded sellers.
In the next subsection, we will see an optimal auction under regularity conditions.
3.3 Optimal Auction under Regularity Assumption
First, we make the assumption that,
Hi(ci, qi) = ci +
Fi(ci|qi)
fi(ci|qi)
is non-increasing in qi and non-decreasing in ci. This regularity assumption is the same as regularity assumption
made by Kumar and Iyengar [9]. With this assumption, the buyer’s optimal auction when bidder i submits bid
as (ci, qi) is,
min
n∑
i=1
xiHi(ci, qi) subject to
1. 0 ≤ xi ≤ qi, where xi denotes the quantity that seller i has to supply of bundle x¯i.
2. Buyer’s demands are satisfied.
The condition Xi(ci, qi) is non increasing in ci, ∀ qi and ∀ i. After this problem has been solved, the buyer
pays each seller i the amount
ti = cix
∗
i +
∫ c¯i
ci
xi(t, qi)dt (10)
where x∗i is what agent i has to supply after solving the above problem.
We exemplify the optimal mechanism with one example.
Example 3.2. Suppose, the buyer is interested in buying 100 units of {A,C,D} and 250 units of {B}. Seller
1 (S1) is interested in providing q1 = 100 units of bundle {A,B}, seller 2 (S2): q2 = 100 units of {B}, seller
3, (S3) q3 = 150 units of {B,C,D} and seller 4 (S4) is interested in up to q4 = 120 units of {A,B,C,D}. The
unit costs of the respective bundles are c1 = 100, c2 = 50, c3 = 70 and c4 = 110. Each seller will submit his bid
as (ci, qi). After receiving the bids, buyer will solve,
min x1H1(100, 100) + x2H2(50, 100)
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+x3H3(70, 150) + x4H4(110, 120)
s.t.
xi ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
x1 ≤ 100
x2 ≤ 100
x3 ≤ 150
x4 ≤ 120
x1 + x2 ≥ 100 (11)
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 ≥ 250 (12)
x3 + x4 ≥ 100 (13)
Equation (11) is required to be satisfied as at least 100 units of A has to be procured. Equation (12) is for
procuring at least 250 units of B, and Equation (13) is for procuring at least 100 units of C and D. After
solving this optimization problem, she will determine the payment according to Equation (10).
It can be seen that for the seller i, the best response is to bid truthfully irrespective of whatever the others are
bidding. Thus, this mechanism enjoys the stronger property, namely dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
Note that this property is much stronger than BIC. The above property is a direct consequence of the result
proved by Mookherjee, and Stefan [13]. They have given the monotonicity conditions for DSIC implementation
of a BIC mechanism. Under these regularity assumptions, xi satisfies these conditions. So we have a DSIC
mechanism. In the next section we consider X-OR bidding with unit demand case.
4 An Optimal Auction when Bidders are XOR Minded
Consider the situation where a supplier can manufacture some of the items required by the buyer, say A,B,C,D.
However, with the machinery he has, at a time either he can manufacture A,D or B,C but not any other
combination simultaneously. Thus he can either supply A,D as bundle or B,C as a bundle but not both. That
is, he is interested in X-OR bidding.
Definition 4.1 (XOR Minded Bidder). We say a bidder is an XOR minded if he is interested in supplying
either of two disjoint subsets of items auctioned for but not both.
To simplify the analysis, in this section, we restrict ourselves to the unit demand case. That is the buyer is
interested in buying single unit of each of the items from I. And hence there are no capacity constraints. We
formally state assumptions.
• We assume that the bidders are XOR minded.
• For each bidder, his costs of the two bundles of his interest are independent.
• The two bundles for which each seller is going to submit an X-OR bid, are known.
• The sellers can collectively supply the items required by the buyer.
• The buyer and the sellers are strategic.
• Free disposal. That is, if the buyer procures more than one unit of an item, he can freely dispose it of.
With the above assumptions, we now discuss an extension of the current art of designing optimal auctions
for combinatorial auctions in the presence of XOR minded bidders. Though we assume the bidders are XOR
minded, the BIC characterization and the auction designed here work even though the bidders are either single
minded or XOR minded.
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4.1 Notation
As, qi = 1 for each bidder, we drop capacity from the types and bids for all the agents. Each agent will be
reporting the costs for each bundle of his interest, he will be bidding two real numbers. And we need to calculate
virtual costs on both the bundles. Thus, we need appropriate modifications in some of the notation used in the
paper. We summarize the new notation for this section in Table 2. Each agent is submitting tow different bids
on two different bundles. We will use j to refer to the bundle.
Table 2: Notation: XOR Minded Bidders
j j = 1 or 2. Bundle index.
Bij The j
th bundle of items for which the agent i is bidding. j = 1, 2
cij True cost of production of Bij to the seller i. cij ∈ [ci, c¯i]
ci = (ci1 , ci2)
θi True type i.e. costs for i, θi = (ci1 , ci2)
bi Bid of the seller i. bi = (cˆi1 , cˆi2)
xij = xij (b) Indicator variable to indicate whether Bi1 is to be procured from
the seller i when the bid vector is b
Xij (bi) Probability that Bij is procured from the seller i when he
submits bid bi. Expectation is taken over all possible values of b−i
fij (cij ) Probability density function of (cij )
Fij (cij ) Cumulative distribution function of cij
Hij (cij ) Virtual cost function for seller i, for bundle Bij
Hij (cij ) = cij +
Fij (cij )
fij (cij )
4.2 Optimal Auctions When Bidders Are XOR Minded
First we characterize the BIC and IIR mechanisms for the settings under consideration in next subsection. We
design an optimal auction in subsection 4.2.2.
4.2.1 BIC and IIR: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
The utility for the agent i is
Ui(bi, θi) = −ci1Xi1 − ci2Xi2 + Ti(bi, θi)
Using similar arguments as in the proof of the Theorem 3.1, for any mechanism in the presence of XOR minded
bidders, the necessary condition for BIC is,
∂U(.)
∂ci1
= Xi1(ci1 , ci2)
∂U(.)
∂ci2
= Xi2(ci1 , ci2) (14)
and Xij (ci1 , ci2) should be non-increasing in cij , j = 1, 2.
We make an assumption that,
∂Xi1
∂ci2
=
∂Xi2
∂ci1
(15)
In general, the above assumption is not necessary for the mechanism to be truthful. However, if we assume
that Equation (15) is true, we can solve PDE (14) analytically. Now we can state the following theorem,
Theorem 4.1. With assumption (15), a necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to be BIC and IIR
in the presence of XOR minded bidders is,
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1. Ti(.) = ci1Xi1 + ci2Xi2 +
∫ (ci,ci)
(ci1 ,ci2)
▽Ui(.)dθi
2. Ui(ci, ci) ≥ 0.
4.2.2 Optimal Auction with Regularity Assumption
Suppose we assume that, Hij is non-decreasing in cij for each i, j. This is the same regularity assumption as
Myerson [14]. Now, following similar treatment for buyers problem as in Section 3.3, reduces the buyers problem
to:
min
∑n
i=1
∑2
j=1 xijHij (cij )
subject to
1. xij ∈ 0, 1, where xij indicates whether supplier i is supplying hiss
jth bundle or no.
2. xi1 + xi2 ≤ 1. (XOR minded bidder).
3. All the items are procured.
(16)
Now, we show that at optimal allocation, the assumption (15) holds true. For an agent i, fix, θ−i and
consider the square of his types [ci, ci]× [ci, ci]. When he bids, bi = (ci, ci), he does not win any item. However,
if he decreases his bid on cij , he wins the bundle Bij at some lower bid and at a lower bid for Bij , he continues
to win. Also, he being XOR minded, he cannot win both the bundles. Thus, the type set’s square can be
partitioned into three regions, R1, R2 and R3 as shown in Figure 1. When his type is in region Rj , he is asked
to supply Bij , j = 1, 2 and when it is in R3 he is not in the list of winning agents. Now, except on the boundary
between R1 and R2, the assumption (15) holds true. Hence, though we are not using (15) as a necessary
condition, it is getting satisfied in optimization problem (16). Thus OCAX is an optimal combinatorial auction
for the buyer in the presence of XOR minded bidders.
Figure 1: X-OR Bidding
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4.2.3 The Case when Regularity Assumption is not Satisfied
Though we do not solve the buyer’s problem of optimal mechanism design without the regularity assumption,
we highlight some thoughts on this. If we can assume (15), then we can design an optimal auction very similar
to the OCAS, in the presence of XOR minded bidders. The challenge is, we cannot use (15) as a necessary
condition nor can we assume it. However, it may happen that in an optimal auction, the condition (15), will
hold true. We are still working on this.
5 Conclusion
In this paper,
• we have stated and proved a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatible and individually
rational multi-unit multi-item auctions in the presence of single minded, capacitated buyers.
• We have given a blueprint of an optimal mechanism, for a buyer seeking to procure multiple units of
multiple items in the presence of single minded and capacitated sellers.
• We also have shown that the mechanism minimizes the cost subject to DSIC and IIR if the virtual cost
functions satisfy the regularity assumptions.
• When bidders are XOR minded, under certain regularity conditions, we designed an optimal auction for
the buyer which we call as OCAX.
There are many natural extensions to this work. First, we can study optimal auctions in which the sellers
are willing to give volume discounts. We also plan to study a case where the sellers are interested in supplying
multiple bundles.
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